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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Additionally, federal courts in New York continue to pass on the
validity of the various provisional remedies provided in the CPLR.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., declared sections of the at-
tachment statute unconstitutional as violative of procedural due
process.
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 214(5): Statute of limitations problems in determining whether
action for strict products liability sounds in tort or contract.
The dwindling importance of privity in the area of products lia-
bility and the resulting expansion in recovery for personal injury and
property damage caused by defectively manufactured products have
elicited substantial attention from courts' and commentators.2 None-
theless, the present state of the law in New York is far from definitive.8
Particularly vexing has been the ambiguity evidenced with respect to
selection of the appropriate statute of limitations.4 In this area, more
so than in others, the applicable limitation period can be crucial, since
injury often occurs many years after the. original sale of the defective
commodity.5
l See, e.g., Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969) (manufacturer of defective oxygen mask held liable to rescuers); Gold-
berg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963) (airplane manufacturer liable for passenger's death); Randy Knitwear v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (manufacturer of
chemical used to retard fabric shrinkage held liable to remote purchaser who sustained
economic injury); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.YS.2d 39
(1961) (seller's warranty extended to members of purchaser's household).
Jurisdictions other than New York have also dealt with this issue. See, e.g., Stang
v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972) (strict liability in tort adopted); Ritter
v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971) (adoption of § 402A of
Restatement (Second) of Torts, providing for strict liability in tort).
2 See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960); Comment, The Last Vestige of the Citadel, Sym-
posium on Products Liability, 2 HorsrRa L. Rv. 721 (1974); The Survey, 49 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 170, 172 (1974).
a See The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 170, 172 (1974).
4 It has been said that "[n]othing in the law of procedure has more sudden or sub-
stantive impact" than the statute of limitations. Siegel, Procedure Catches UP-And
Makes Trouble, in Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 45 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rav. 63 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Siegel]. The definitions of limitation periods in
the CPLR are in themselves confusing, since some are based on a theory of liability,
e.g., breach of contract (CPLR 213(2)), while others are in terms of the injury suffered,
e.g., property damage or personal injury (CPLR 214(4), (5)). 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 214,
commentary at 429 (1972).
5 Such a case was presented in Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d
316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JoHN's L. Rav.
170, 172 (1974). The infant plaintiff was seriously injured by a defective product sold
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In Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,6 the Court of Appeals
refused to recognize an independent cause of action in strict tort lia-
bility,7 holding the contract statute of limitations applicable to all
warranty theories of liability resulting from defective products.8, Sev-
eral years later, the Court, in Codling v. Paglia,9 created a new cause
of action denominated "strict products liability." While outlining
several requirements which, if satisfied, would allow any person injured
by a defective product to recover from the manufacturer,10 the Court
failed to clearly define all of the contours of the action. Subsequently,
theorists have attempted to determine whether Codling represents
the final extension of the implied warranty of fitness for use to non-
contracting third parties or a new tort action intended to foreclose any
further broadening of warranty. 1
If the Codling action is contractual, the four-year statute of limita-
tionS12 would apply, commencing from the date of sale; if its nature is
tortious, the plaintiff would have three years13 from the time of in-
jury14 within which to bring his action. In Rivera v. Berkeley Super
Wash, Inc.,15 the Appellate Division, Second Department, took a stand
more than eight years prior to the injury. In evaluating the policy considerations in-
volved, the court stated:
It is dearly unjust to deny an injured party the possibility of compensation on
the wholly arbitrary basis of a lapse of a period of time, the inception of which
period of time is in no way connected with him and the passage of which bears
no relation to any laches on his part.
44 App. Div. 2d at 325, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
6 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), discussed in Symposium on
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 62 (1970).
7 See note 29 infra.
825 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
9 32 N.Y.2d 3390, 298 NX.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), discussed in The Survey,
48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 611, 616 (1974).
10 The Court stated:
We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manu-
facturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if
the defect was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury or damages;
provided: (1) that at the time of the occurrence the product is being used ...
in the manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured ...is himself
the user .. . he would not by the exercise of reasonable care have both dis-
covered the defect and perceived its danger, and (3) that by the exercise of
reasonable care the person injured ...would not otherwise have averted his
injury or damages.
32 N.Y.2d at 342, 298 N.E2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
11 See, e.g., Murphy, New Directions in Products Liability, 612 INs. L.J. 40, 44-45
(1974); 43 FoRUHAm L. REv. 322 (1974); The Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 611, 616 (1974).
12 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). This section applies prospectively to those
sales made after September 27, 1964. CPLR 213(2), with its six-year period, applies to
sales consummated prior to that date.
13 CPLR 214(5).
14 See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
1544 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.&2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974), discussed in The Survey,
49 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 170, 172 (1974).
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in favor of the tort limitation, relying on a recent Court of Appeals
decision' 6 in which the Codling-created action was described as "sound-
[ing] in tort rather than in contract."'17 Notwithstanding Rivera, until
the Court of Appeals expressly determines the issue, the lower courts
will continue to be faced with the problem of reconciling the various
decisions.18
The resulting confusion was recently exemplified in Lewis v. John
Royle & Sons.19 Plaintiff's hand and arm were crushed in an extruder
manufactured and designed by the defendant. Based on Mendel, claims
for breach of warranty and strict liability in tort were dismissed as
untimely,20 the action having been commenced more than six years
from the date of sale.21 In effect, these actions were barred before
plaintiff was injurecl. A third claim for negligence was dismissed on a
motion for summary judgment.22 Subsequently, plaintiff sought to
amend his complaint and reallege his strict liability claim pursuant to
the intervening decisions of Codling and Rivera.
The Supreme Court, Broome County, avoided the problematic
area of limitations by denying the motion on the merits.23 In dicta,
however, it distinguished the two causes of action discussed in Mendel
and Codling. Viewing the Codling theory of "strict products lia-
bility"24 as a tort cause of action, the court assigned to it the personal
injury statute of limitations.25 Furthermore, the court preserved
Mendel's viability by considering its extended warranty cause of action
to be a second avenue for bringing the same claim.26 Understandably,
the Lewis court applied the contract limitation period to the warranty
action. 27 In itself, this analysis is not unique;28 however, by adhering
16 Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 117, 805 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.YS.2d
617 (1973).
17 Id. at 124-25, 805 NYE.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
18 The Rivera court handled the conflict between Mendel and Codling by stating
that Mendel is "still the law as to warranty causes of action ...... 44 App. Div. 2d
at 326, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
19 79 Misc. 2d 804, 857 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Broome County), afJ'd, 46 App. Div. 2d
304, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (8d Dep't 1974).
20 The trial term's order was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department.
87 App. Div. 2d 639, 322 N.Y.S.2d 314 (3d Dep't 1971), motion for leave to appeal denied,
80 N.Y.2d 481, 280 N.E.2d 894, 330 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1972).
21 The sale of the machine was consummated on June 6, 1963, before the Uniform
Commercial Code went into effect. 87 App. Div. 2d at 639, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 316. There-
fore, the six-year statute of limitations applied. CPLR 213(2). See note 12 supra.
22 See 79 Misc. 2d at 809, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
23 Id. at 808.09, 857 N.YS.2d at 606-07.
24 See note 10 supra.
25 79 Misc. 2d at 807, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
26 Id. at 806-07, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
27 Id.
28 See Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 821, 854 N.YS.2d
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to the Mendel description of "strict liability in tort" as synonymous
with implied warranty absent privity,29 the court reached the curious
result of applying contract rules to what it labeled a tort claim. 3 0
This unlikely interpretation is indicative of the confusion caused
in part by the melange of contradictory labels used by the Court of
Appeals in describing this cause of action. The problem originated in
the extension of implied warranty to those not in privity.31 Since the
action was based on contract but extended to noncontracting parties
because of the injuries suffered, i.e., torts, the action emerged as a
hybrid, sounding in tort and contract.32 Yet, the Court, in a 1953
decision,33 stated:
[A]Ithough such a breach of duty may rest upon, or be associated
with, a tortious act, it is independent of negligence, and so such
a cause of action gets . . . the six-year limit ... as being on an
implied contract obligation or liability.3 4
Mendel agreed that the theory involved was breach of warranty and
accordingly was governed by the contract statute of limitations. 5
Nevertheless, the Court confounded the issue by equating this action
with one for strict liability in tort.3 6 Codling failed to clarify the
654, 659 (2d Dep't 1974). Apparently, the appellate division has been content to allow
the two avenues to develop independently. Thus, in Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42 App. Div.
2d 727, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2d Dep't 1973), it brought the warranty concept a step further
by extending Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E2d 81, 240
N.YS.2d 592 (1963), to allow a breach of warranty claim by an injured purchaser against
a component part manufacturer. This cause of action was considered a remedy addi-
tional to that provided by Codling. 42 App. Div. 2d at 727, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
2925 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. Specifically, the Mendel
Court stated that "strict liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity
are merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action." Id. The Court
apparently meant only to foreclose the existence of a separate action in tort. Unfortunately,
however, this statement has led to the application of the "strict liability in tort" label to
what Mendel put forth as strictly an "extended breach of warranty" action.
The Mendel Court went on to say:
Although it is true that a plaintiff may have two different theories of recovery
involving the same wrong with different limitation periods (e.g., negligence and
breach of warranty), it would be absurd to have two different periods of limita-
tion applicable to the same cause of action, with the same elements of proof,
complaining of the very same wrong.
Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
30 79 Misc. 2d at 306-07, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
31See notes 1-2 supra.
32 Dean Prosser has stated that "[t]he seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
634 (Hornbook ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
33 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
84Id. at 147, 111 N.E2d at 422-23. See note 12 supra. It is interesting to note that
"CPLR 214 eliminates the former separate provisions that turned upon whether or not
the injury resulted from negligence." 1 WKM 214.12.
35 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
30 See note 29 supra.
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matter. While the Court therein termed the "new" cause of action
"strict products liability," i.e., tortious, its announcement was prem-
ised on an analysis of the case law extending breach of warranty.3 7
In Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc.,38 the Appellate Division,
Second Department, has offered a solution"9 by defining strict products
liability as a tortious action and assigning to it the personal injury
statute of limitations.40 Additionally, the court restricted the applica-
bility of Mendel to warranty causes.41 By so holding, the Second De-
partment has offered the Court of Appeals an opportunity to resolve
the important questions pertaining to the statute of limitations.2 As
the Survey has urged, the Court of Appeals should affirm the holding
in Rivera.43 A simple affirmance is not sufficient, however; in so doing,
the Court should carefully define the contours of this cause of action,
both procedural and substantive.44 Part of this definition includes
establishing the terminology which most appropriately describes its
nature. Only such a painstaking effort will prevent Lewis-type con-
fusion from proliferating.
37 32 N.Y.2d at 388-42, 298 N.E.2d at 626-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 466-70.
38 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974).
89 Speaking of the Codling creation of a strict products liability action, the Rivera
court noted, "To be sure, the terms used to describe the cause of action which has evolved
have caused their share of confusion .. Id. at 320, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 658. The court
went on to say that "strict products liability" is "the term apparently preferred by our
Court of Appeals ...." Id.
40 CPLR 214(5). See text accompanying notes 18-14 supra.
41 See note 18 supra. The Rivera court felt that "Codling overruled Mendel's reliance
on the Uniform Commercial Code when it (Codling) provided an alternative remedy
sounding in tort." 44 App. Div. 2d at 824, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
42 In this regard, the counsel of Professor David D. Siegel should be followed:
What the Court of Appeals does have in any event to do is decide for itself just
what its broad purposes are in this personal injury area and then go about the
business of seeing to it that arguable procedural or other collateral matters not
be permitted to obscure the aim.
Siegel, supra note 4, at 70. See note 5 supra.
43 See The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 170, 180 (1974).
44 There are numerous unsettled ramifications stemming from the nature of this cause
of action. For example, assuming the strict products liability action is deemed purely
tortious, the question arises whether liability can be disclaimed. The Court of Appeals,
in Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 805 N.E.2d 750, 850 N.Y.S2d
617 (1978), indicated that disclaimer was possible:
Although strict products liability sounds in tort rather than in contract, we see
no reason why in the absence of some consideration of public policy parties can-
not by contract restrict or modify what would otherwise be a liability between
them grounded in tort.
Id. at 124-25, 805 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623. This seems illogical, since preventing
tortious conduct by holding liable the person responsible therefor is usually considered a
mandate of public policy.
Another unresolved issue is that of retroactivity. In view of the line of cases illus-
trating the Court of Appeals' concern with the policy issues involved in products liability,
see cases cited in note 1 supra, it would appear that the Codling action should have
retroactive application. In Lewis, the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirming
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ARTICLE 3- JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): Appellate Division vacillates in construction of
foreseeability requirement of long-arm statute.
Where a nondomiciliary commits a tortious act outside New
York which produces injury to persons or property within the state,
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) may provide a jurisdictional predicate. 45 The pro-
vision, enacted in 1966, was intended to abrogate the rule of Feathers
v. McLucas,46 which had left a plaintiff, injured under such circum-
stances, without recourse.4 7
the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, refused to apply Codling because
"the issue was completely litigated and the appeal process carried to its ultimate dispo-
sition ... " 46 App. Div. 2d at 305, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 264. By so deciding, it avoided the
question of retroactivity.
Finally, one must consider the position of the retailer. In extending warranty liability,
the intent of the Court was to place the burden for the injuries caused by defective
products on the manufacturer, i.e., the one who controls production. See Codling v.
Paglia, 32 NY.2d 330, 339-41, 298 NE2d 622, 626-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 467-69; Comment,
The Last Vestige of the Citadel, in Symposium on Products Liability, 2 HoFsrRA L. REv.
721, 726 (1974). In light of this purpose, should the retailer be limited in any cross-claim
against the manufacturer by a contract statute of limitations? The inequity of this situa-
tion is discussed in Siegel, supra note 4, at 69-70. The Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment, in a decision prior to Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), held that a middle-man would not be able to implead the original
manufacturer when the contract statute of limitations had expired. The court cited
Mendel as authority. Ibach v. Grant Donaldson Serv., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 39, 45, 326
N.Y.S.2d 720, 725-26 (4th Dep't 1971).
A number of jurisdictions have resolved the question of products liability by legisla-
tion. See 43 FoRDHA2 L. Rev. 322, 328-29 n.53 (1974). A legislative approach has been
considered preferable in light of the potential complications that may be unforeseen in
any single judicial decision. See id. at 328-29.
45 CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) allows for personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciiary if he
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state ... if he
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international com-
merce.
The limitations within subparagraph (ii) of subdivision (a)(3) were inserted, along
with subparagraph (i), to keep CPLR 302 "well within constitutional bounds." Legislative
Reports, N.Y. SEss. LAws [1966], at 2749, 2786 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Re-
ports]. See A. Milner Co. v. Noudar, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 293 (Ist
Dep't 1966), ("[i]n the enactment of the CPLR the Legislature has not extended New
York's jurisdiction to the utmost constitutional limit'). But see Lewin v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 601, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), afrd mem.,
22 App. Div. 2d 854, 255 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 1070, 213
N.E.2d 686, 266 N.Y..2d 391 (1965) ("New York has committed itself to a full exploitation
of jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries').
46 15 N.Y.2d 433, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.YS.2d 8 (1965).
47 Prior to amending the CPLR, it was stated:
In the light of the Feathers decision, it is dear that amendment of CPLR 302
(a)(2) is necessary if legal protection is to be accorded to New York residents who
are injured within the state by foreign tort-feasors who cannot be reached through
implementation of the transaction of business clause ....
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